A retailer is endowed with a finite inventory of a non-perishable product. Demand for this product is driven by a price-sensitive Poisson process that depends on an unknown parameter, θ; a proxy for the market size. If θ is high then the retailer can take advantage of a large market charging premium prices, but if θ is small then price markdowns can be applied to encourage sales. The retailer has a prior belief on the value of θ which he updates as time and available information (prices and sales) evolve. We also assume that the retailer faces an opportunity cost when selling this non-perishable product. This opportunity cost is given by the long-term average discounted profits that the retailer can make if he switches and starts selling a different assortment of products. The retailer's objective is to maximize the discounted long-term average profits of his operation using dynamic pricing policies. We consider two cases. In the first case, the retailer is constrained to sell the entire initial stock of the non-perishable product before a different assortment is considered. In the second case, the retailer is able to stop selling the non-perishable product at any time to switch to a different menu of products. In both cases, the retailer's pricing policy trades-off immediate revenues and future profits based on active demand learning. We formulate the retailer's problem as a (Poisson) intensity control problem and derive structural properties of an optimal solution which we use to propose a simple approximated solution. This solution combines a pricing policy and a stopping rule (if stopping is an option) depending on the inventory position and the retailer's belief about the value of θ. We use numerical computations, together with asymptotic analysis, to evaluate the performance of our proposed solution.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with dynamic pricing policies for non-perishable products in the context of a retail operation with uncertain demand. In particular, we investigate the interplay between demand learning and pricing decisions and their impact on the long-term performance of the business.
Effective retail management is about managing a limited available capacity to procure and sell the right assortment of products while considering present and future market developments. This point of view is captured by one of the most popular measures in the retail industry, namely, average sales per square foot per unit time. Indeed, this measure highlights two fundamental aspects of a retail operations. First, it emphasizes the fact that capacity, measured by store or shelf space, is one of the retailer's key assets and thus must be managed as such; the challenge resides in choosing the best alternative menu of products, failure to do so results in opportunity costs cutting directly into the profit margins. Second, it highlights the time value of money when assessing the business performance. For instance, a retailer might prefer to sell a product that has a 5% margin to another one that offers a 10% margin if the former sells much faster than the latter. Thus, in optimizing this measure, retailers must balance the short-term benefits obtained by selling a given menu of products and the long-term opportunity costs incurred by allocating their resources (store space, time, capital, etc.) on these products instead of a different assortment.
In addition to such critical trade-off, retailers cannot overlook the market conditions in which they compete. Customers' preferences, competitors' actions, new product introduction, regulations, and so on, are often unknown to the retailer and need to be factored into the business strategy. As a result, learning about these market factors, induced for instance through the sales process, should be constantly performed. Such learning would shed more lights on future demand and hint on the current strategy to adopt. A product that sells well today might get stocked on the shelves tomorrow wasting valuable space that could be used to sell a more profitable alternative. To prevent this highly undesirable situation, a retailer must be able to monitor and learn customers' preferences dynamically to quickly identify the selling pattern of each product. Low selling items must be removed either by shipping them to a secondary market (e.g., an outlet) or by liquidating their inventory through active price markdowns. It is precisely this relationship among demand learning, pricing policies and inventory rotation that we study in this paper using a stylized retail operation.
In our model, which is presented in detail in Section 2, a retailer sells a single non-perishable product with unknown demand characteristics. The retailer controls dynamically the price of the product and uses all available information (i.e., price and sale history) to learn demand attributes over time. The problem faced by this retailer is given by the so-called exploration versus exploitation trade-off. On the one hand, pricing policies affect immediate revenues (exploitation). On the other hand, the selling pattern they induce impacts the retailer's ability to learn demand (exploration); a knowledge that can be used to increase future profits. We tackle this problem using a sequence of models with increasing degree of complexity. First, in Section 3, we study the perfect information case in which the retailer knows all demand parameters with certainty. In this setting, we derive an optimal pricing policy and characterize the retailer's long-term profit as a function of the inventory level. From a practical standpoint, we view this full information case as good approximation for an experienced retailer that sells in a mature market. In Section 4, we relax the perfect information assumption and consider the case in which the demand intensity depends on an unknown parameter, θ; a proxy for the size of the market. The retailer has a prior belief on the value of θ that he dynamically updates over time. We also assume that the retailer must deplete the entire stock of the product before a different assortment can be sold. This condition is satisfied in many practical situations in which the retailer has no secondary market where to ship unpopular items or the cost of this shipment is prohibited. Section 5 discusses a more general case in which the retailer has imperfect information about the value of θ having the option to stop selling the product at any time to switch to a more profitable alternative. In Section 6 we present some extensions of the model and concluding remarks are offered in Section 7.
We conclude this Introduction by attempting to position our paper within the vast literature on dynamic pricing and demand learning in operations management. Our pricing formulation is closely related to the continuous-time (Poisson) intensity control problem studied by Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) (see also Bitran and Caldentey 2003 , Elmaghraby and Keskinocak 2003 , Talluri and van Ryzin 2004 for related references) but with some noticeable differences. First, we depart from the revenue management setting by considering a non-perishable product. Unlike the airline industry where flight departure dates are hard constraints to meet, our modeling suits better a retail operation in which the seller has the flexibility to adjust the duration of the selling season based on market contingencies. As a consequence, we look at the retailer's infinite horizon operations and use a discounted long-term average profit objective function.
As we mentioned before, a distinguishing feature of our demand model is that it depends on an unknown parameter. Practically, we apply dynamic pricing to maximize revenues which creates an incentive for (Bayesian) learning. The underlying process is then a nonhomogeneous Poisson process parameterized by the unknown parameter θ. From a mathematical point of view, the learning side of our paper resembles the sequential testing hypotheses problem studied broadly in Statistics; see for instance Shiryayev (1978) or more recently Peskir and Shiryaev (2000) . The latter study the problem of observing the output of a homogeneous Poisson process with unknown rate (either high or low) up to a time that needs to be optimally chosen based on costs considerations.
The Economics literature borrows some of these ideas. Indeed, learning and experimentation through Bayesian update in an infinite horizon setting has been extensively studied. Some of the most fundamental questions that this type of works try to answer relate to the value of learning and whether for instance optimal strategies eventually converge to the true state of the system or not (see Bolton and Harris (1999) , Keller and Rady (1999) and references therein). Often in such stream of research the only connection between periods occur through the belief process; as opposed to operations in general, and our paper in particular, where other state variables such as manufacturing capacity or inventory levels are included.
Bayesian learning in the scope of a periodic inventory control problem, has been pioneered by Scarf (1958) ; see also Azoury (1985) , Lovejoy (1990) , Eppen and Iyer (1997) , Lariviere and Porteus (1999) , and references therein. This literature is mainly concerned with determining optimal inventory decisions under various modes of procurement such as periodic replenishment or newsvendor type models. The problem of optimal assortment in a multiproduct setting has also received some attention. For example, Caro and Gallien (2005) study a discrete time finite horizon problem using a multiarmed bandit formulation and Bayesian learning. At each time period, the seller must decide the subset of products to offer based on historical sale data. The authors propose a simple index policy based on a relaxation of the dynamic program. In most of this inventory related research, however, pricing policies and their impact on revenues and demand learning are not investigated.
More recently, there has been an increase interest on demand learning models in the context of dynamic pricing. Most of this literature focuses on the finite horizon setting. Petruzzi and Dada (2002) analyze the problem of learning while controlling inventory and prices in a discrete time setting. Demand in every period is a deterministic function of price perturbed by an unknown parameter and its probability distribution is updated using successive censored sale data. In this setting, the authors characterize the structure of an optimal policy. Recently, Carvalho and Puterman (2004) study dynamic pricing of an uncapacitated system under an exponential demand function (perturbed by a Gaussian noise) with unknown parameters, estimated through a Kalman filter. Similarly, Lobo and Boyd (2003) consider a linear price demand function and obtain approximated solutions using convex programming methods.
In the context of revenue management, Aviv and Pazgal (2002) introduce Bayesian learning within the dynamic pricing model of Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) but with unknown demand intensity. The prior distribution of this intensity is assumed to be Gamma which is a conjugate distribution for the Poisson demand process. Properties of an optimal pricing policy that trades-off revenue maximization and demand learning are derived. On a similar setting, Aviv and Pazgal (2005) propose a partially observed Markov decision process framework to compute an upper bound on the seller's revenue and derive some heuristics to approximate the optimal pricing policy. Xu and Hopp (2005) propose a piecewise linear demand model with unknown parameters and use Bayes updating to investigate some martingale properties of the optimal price process. Bertsimas and Perakis (2005) consider a discrete time model in which demand is a linear function of the price with unknown coefficients and perturbed by a white noise. Both the monopolistic and oligopolistic cases are studied. Instead of Bayesian learning, the authors use a least square estimation embedded in a dynamic program with incomplete state information. Some approximations and heuristics are proposed to reduce the dimensionality of the problem. Finally, in the infinite horizon setting, Cope (2004) analyzes the problem of dynamic pricing through a nonparametric Bayesian demand model; pricing decisions in his model, however, are independent of inventory levels. We believe our model contributes to the existing literature in a number of directions. First of all, we propose a parsimonious continuous time formulation to model the problem of a retailer selling nonperishable products with uncertain demand characteristics. We use dynamic programming methods to formulate the problem and propose a set of simple algorithms to efficiently solve it. A distinguishing feature of our formulation is that it includes explicitly a terminal reward that captures the opportunity cost of the seller's operations. This opportunity cost can induce the retailer to stop selling the product at any time discarding unsold units; a feature that is not captured by traditional revenue management models. We also derive simple managerial guidelines that reflect the essential characteristics of an optimal policy (pricing and stopping) and use numerical experiments and asymptotic analysis to evaluate their performance.
Model Description
Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space endowed with a standard (rate 1) Poisson process D = (D(t) : t ≥ 0) and let F = (F t ) t≥0 be the usual filtration generated by D. For a given θ > 0, we define the probability measure P θ under which D(t) is Poisson process with rate θ. Note that P coincides with P 1 . We denote by E θ the expectation operator under P θ . Also, for every adapted process f t , non-anticipating with respect to D(t), we define I f (t) t 0 f s ds. In this probabilistic environment, we consider the following stylized retail operations. At time t = 0, a retailer owns N 0 identical units of a non-perishable product that he can sell to a stochastically arriving stream of buyers. These buyers are price sensitive and their purchasing behavior is modulated by an adapted price process {p t : t ≥ 0} selected by the retailer. In particular, any given price p affects instantaneously the demand rate which we denote by λ(p). We let D(I λ (t)) be the corresponding cumulative demand process up to time t. Under P θ , this cumulative demand define a non-homogeneous Poisson process with intensity θ λ(p t ). The parameter θ > 0 captures the magnitude of the demand intensity while the quantity λ(p) models buyers' sensitivity to price. We refer to θ as the (demand) scale factor and λ(p) as the unscaled demand intensity.
Consistent with standard economic theory, we assume that the mapping p → λ(p) is a continuous, nonnegative, and strictly decreasing function of the price p. Furthermore, to avoid unrealistic unbounded optimal pricing strategies, we impose the additional condition that lim p λ(p) = 0 as p → ∞. These assumptions guarantee the existence of an inverse demand function p(λ) which is well-defined and continuous in the domain [0, Λ] , where Λ λ(0). Based on this one-to-one correspondence between prices and demand intensities, we find convenient to let the seller control demand intensities rather than prices. This is a recurrent modeling approach in the revenue management literature that has proven to be calligraphically efficient (e.g. Gallego and van Ryzin 1994) . Under this change of control variable, we define an admissible selling strategy as an adapted mapping λ : t → λ t where for each time t ≥ 0, λ t ∈ [0, Λ]. We denote by A the set of such strategies. The products we consider in this setting are non-perishable, in the sense that there is no predetermined end of season. Basically, the season will end either when all units have been sold or before if the retailer decides to stop before this depletion time. He can choose to do so at any random stopping time. We denote by T the set of stopping times with respect to F. Section C1 in Appendix C describes two commonly used demand models that satisfy the conditions on the previous paragraph: the exponential demand model with λ(p) = Λ exp(−αp) (e.g. Smith and Achabal 1998) and the linear demand model with λ(p) = Λ − αp. In both cases, Λ is the maximum unscaled demand intensity and α captures customer's sensitivity to price. We will use these two models in our computational experiments throughout the paper.
There are two sources of demand uncertainty in our model. First, as described above, we use a Poisson process to model the arriving pattern of customers. Our choice of a price-sensitive Poisson process to model demand is aligned with the dynamic pricing literature in operations, see Bitran and Caldentey (2003) for more details. Second, we assume that the retailer has only partial information about the value of the scale factor θ. For simplicity, we consider the case in which θ can take only two values {θ L , θ H } with θ L ≤ θ H , where the subscripts L and H stand for Low and High demand intensity, respectively. In section 6 we discuss the case of a multidimensional vector θ.
The retailer starts the selling season with a prior belief q that θ = θ L . As time goes by, and demand data is collected, the retailer is able to update his estimate on the true value of θ. For a given prior q ∈ [0, 1], we use a slight abuse of notation and define the probability measure PP θ L + (1 − q) P θ H , with expectation operator E q . The seller's problem is to dynamically adjust the demand intensity λ t in order to maximize longterm expected cumulative profits. In particular, we consider the following intensity control problem
A few remarks about this control problem are in order. Our modeling differs from the more traditional revenue management literature (e.g., Talluri and van Ryzin 2004 , Bitran and Caldentey 2003 , Elmaghraby and Keskinocak 2003 in a couple of dimensions. Because of the non-perishability of the product, our model does not consider a fixed finite horizon but rather an infinite-horizon stopping time problem. Note that the stopping time τ allows the retailer to stop selling the product at any time satisfying constraint (3), while backorders are not allowed. Another difference -which is consistent with our infinite horizon view of the retailer's operation-is the use of discount rate r > 0 that penalizes future cash flows. Finally, a distinguishing aspect of our model is the terminal value R, which captures the opportunity cost of the retailer's operation. We interpret R as the expected discounted cash flows that the seller can get from his retail business after he stops selling the current product. In practice, estimating the "correct" value of R is a difficult task. A commonly used rule-of-thumb is to consider the historical returns of the operation. (Other interpretations based on operational costs or property values are also possible). However, this measure fails to take into account new information about markets and products. We do not model the problem of computing this opportunity cost as it goes beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we assume that the retailer has been able to get a good estimate of the value of R. It is possible that in some cases the reward R is a function of the terminal inventory N τ (similar to the dumping option in Eppen and Iyer 1997) . We postpone the discussion of this extension to section 6.
In the following three sections, we study problem (1)-(3) under different degrees of complexity. We start looking at the simplest (full information) case in which the retailer knows the value of θ at t = 0.
Dynamic Pricing with Perfect Demand Information
In this section, we solve the retailer's optimization problem and derive structural properties of its solution assuming that θ is fully known so that P q = P θ . Also, to ease the exposition, we first solve problem (1)-(3) replacing the inequality sign in (3) by an equality sign. That is, we assume that all units must be sold before the retailer can start selling a different assortment. The solution for the case with inequality sign in (3) will follow directly from this analysis (see the discussion following Proposition 1).
Under some minor technical conditions on λ (see section §III.3 in Brémaud (1980)), we can rewrite the seller's optimization problem as follows.
subject to
where c(λ) λ p(λ) is the unscaled revenue rate function. We denote by c * max{c(λ) : λ ∈ [0, Λ]} the maximum unscaled revenue rate, which is guaranteed to exist given the continuity of c(λ) in [0, Λ] . Without loss of generality, and for the rest of the paper, we normalize the unscaled revenue rate function (by adequately adjusting the scale factor θ) so that c * = r R.
We interpret W (n) as the value function for the associated dynamic programming formulation, which measures the expected discounted cumulative revenue when the current inventory level is n. Observe that W includes revenues from both the current product and future ones (captured by R). To emphasize the dependence of W on the scaling factor θ, we will occasionally use the notation W (n; θ) for this value function.
Invoking standard stochastic control arguments (chapter VII in Brémaud 1980), we get the first order optimality condition for this value function in the form of the following Hamilton-JacobiBellman (HJB) equation.
To solve this HJB equation, we find convenient to rewrite it as follows
The function Ψ(·) defined on the real line, is nonnegative and monotonically increasing. It admits an inverse function given by Φ(z) Ψ −1 (z) (z ∈ R + ). The function Ψ(·) is known as the FenchelLegendre transform of c(·) and has been extensively used in the context of large deviation theory (see Dembo and Zeitouni (1998) ). For future references, we also define the function
This function ζ(z) is nondecreasing and satisfies on equation (8), we can compute the value function iteratively through the recursion
To complete the characterization of the optimal solution, the optimal demand intensity λ * (n) for an inventory of n can be found solving
Using the monotonicity of Φ(z), the recursion in (10), and our scaling condition c * = r R, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 For every θ > 0 and R ≥ 0 there is a unique solution W = (W (n) : n ∈ N) to the recursion (10) . If the scale factor θ ≥ 1 (resp. θ ≤ 1) then the value function W is increasing and concave (resp. decreasing and convex) as a function of n. Furthermore, lim n→∞ W (n) = θR.
Proof: See section A1 in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 highlights the effect of the scale parameter θ on revenues. For θ ≥ 1, the revenue function, W (n, θ) is always larger than R, and increases with the inventory level. The opposite conclusion holds for θ ≤ 1. Based on this distinction, we say that a product is high-revenue (or profitable) if θ ≥ 1 and we say that a product is low-revenue (or unprofitable) if θ ≤ 1. From now on we assume θ L ≤ 1 ≤ θ H which is the most interesting case.
The difference between high-revenue and low-revenue products comes from the underlying tradeoff that the seller experiences in terms of present and future revenues. In fact, in our model R captures the future value of the seller's operations after the current product has being depleted. Therefore, for a given discount rate r, the term r R represents the seller's average revenue rate from future businesses. On the other hand, the revenue rate generated by the current product is θ c(λ), for a demand intensity θ λ. Thus, the seller considers the current operations to be more profitable than the average future business if max λ {θ c(λ)} ≥ r R or equivalently θ c * ≥ r R. Given the normalization c * = r R, this condition reduces to θ ≥ 1. In other words, for θ ≥ 1 the current product offers higher returns than the average product that the seller usually sells and so the value function increases with n; in this case, the retailer will always choose to sell this product until no more units are available. On the other hand, if θ ≤ 1 then the seller would like to switch as soon as possible from the current product to a new (more profitable) alternative. If the seller has to deplete all units before switching to another product, then the corresponding value function is a decreasing function of the inventory. In other words, the more units of this low-revenue product the seller has, the longer it is going to take to sell them all and move to a better product. However, if the retailer can stop selling the product at any time, then for θ < 1 he chooses to stop immediately, i.e., τ = 0.
An example of the results in Proposition 1 is depicted in Figure 2 . Besides the monotonicity and convexity properties of the value function, Figure 2 also confirms the asymptotic behavior as the inventory grows large. Specifically, we have that W (n; θ) → θ R as n → ∞. Interestingly, Proposition 1 holds true without requiring the revenue rate function c(λ) to be concave. This is a distinguishing feature of our representation of the value function in (8) in terms of the FenchelLegendre transform Ψ and its inverse Φ. The following corollary emphasizes this point.
is an increasing (resp. decreasing) sequence in the level of inventory n, and
Proof: The result follows directly from concavity (resp. convexity) of W (n) in Proposition 1, equation (11), and the monotonicity of ζ(·).
From a pricing perspective, we note that for a low-revenue product the price increases with the available stock. This is in contrast to most of the dynamic pricing literature e.g., Gallego and van Ryzin 1994 , Proposition 1 and Theorem 1; (the latter is more in synch with our high-revenue product) where optimal prices decrease with the inventory level. This, apparently, counterintuitive result relies on a simple observation. In our setting, the retailer's problem is to trade-off current versus future revenues. As the initial stock increases the time required to deplete these units goes up, as well. As a result, the retailer weights less future revenues and maximizes current revenues by increasing the price. In contrast, for high-revenue products the price decreases with inventory.
The different pricing behavior between low and high revenue products raises an important issue regarding depletion time, specifically, whether we are selling faster when θ is larger. In fact, even if low-revenue products have lower prices than high-revenue, their demand scale factor, θ, is smaller. Hence, the net effect on the demand intensity θ λ(p) is unclear. According to Corollary 1, for n sufficiently large the pricing policies for both low and high revenue products are almost identical and so the effective rate of sales increases with θ. In general, under mild conditions on the demand model, this conclusion holds for all inventory levels.
Proposition 2 Let s n θ λ * n be the optimal rate of sales for a given θ and inventory level n.
then the sales rate s n increases with θ for all n.
Proof: See section A2 in Appendix A.
Condition (12) on the pricing function p(·) is not particularly restrictive and it is satisfied by both the exponential and linear demand models. (A simple derivation of this condition translates in a slightly stronger requirement on c(·) than just concavity.) Interestingly, according to this Proposition even if prices increase with θ the net demand rate still increases with θ. In other words, the inventory turns of high-revenue products are higher than those of low-revenue products even though the former are sold at a higher price than the latter.
As a side remark, we can get an alternative interpretation of condition (12) using the notion of reservation price (e.g. Bitran and Mondschein 1997) . Suppose every arriving buyer has a maximum price that he is willing to pay for the product. The seller is unable to observe this reservation price but only knows its probability distribution (F ) among the population of buyers. In this setting, if the seller charges a price p the resulting demand intensity equals
. For example, if the reservation price is exponentially distributed with parameter α then we recover the exponential demand model λ(p) = Λ exp(−α p) and if the reservation price is uniformly distributed in [0,
Λ α ] then we recover the linear demand model λ(p) = Λ − α p. With this interpretation of the demand process, it is a matter of simple calculations to show that condition (12) is equivalent to the reservation price distribution (F ) having weakly increasing failure rate (IFR) (e.g. Lariviere 2005 ).
We conclude this section with a brief summary of our findings. According to our model, the seller can partition the set of products that he sells in two groups: (i) high-revenue products for which θ ≥ 1 and (ii) low-revenue products for which θ ≤ 1. High-revenue products sell faster and at a higher price than their low-revenue counterpart. Hence, if the seller were able to identify which products offer high revenues and which do not, then he would never engage in procuring and selling low-revenue products. In practice, however, the seller is rarely capable to perfectly anticipate the selling pattern of a given product. This pattern, which depends on customers' preferences and market competition, only reveals itself as the selling season progresses, way after procurement decisions are made.
With this problematic in mind, we study in the following section optimal pricing strategies for the case in which the seller has imperfect knowledge about customers' preferences, or in our case the value of the scale factor θ.
Dynamic Pricing with Incomplete Demand Information
In this section, we consider the case in which the retailer starts the selling horizon having only partial information about the demand scale factor θ. We consider again the case in which θ can take only two values {θ L , θ H } with θ L ≤ 1 ≤ θ H . (A generalization to the case of a multidimensional vector θ is discussed in Section 6). The retailer starts the selling season with a prior belief q that θ = θ L . We also assume in this section that all initial N 0 units must be depleted before a different product can be offered. This final assumption is relaxed in Section 5.
The setting here describes those situations where the retailer is bringing a new product into the market and has uncertain information about how well this product will sell. As the selling period progresses and the demand process materializes, the retailer updates his information and adjusts the price accordingly in order to maximize cumulative discounted profits. This active learning process is essentially a Bayes update on the distribution of θ while the retailer is only observing the sales process over time. It is active in the sense that the optimal price is not only a result of the current belief but also on how it will evolve in the future.
In formal terms, we embedded the model in this section in a filtered probability space Ω, F, (F t ) t≥0 , P q . The probability measure P q satisfies (see Section 2 for notation)
Given the retailer's initial beliefs q, the random variable θ satisfies
We let q t P q (θ = θ L |F t ) be the retailer's belief about the value of θ at time t conditional on the available information F t . Recall that (F t : t ≥ 0) is the filtration generated by the inventory (or equivalently sales) process
In this setting, the retailer problem becomes
We will tackle a solution to (13) using dynamic programming. For this, we will first derive the specific dynamics of q t using Bayes's rule and Itô's lemma.
Proof: See section A3 in Appendix A.
According to (14) , the rate at which the seller beliefs change depends on the difference between the observed demand rate, dD t , and the expected demand rate, (θ L q t− + θ H (1 − q t− ))λ t dt, given the available information. Loosely speaking, the martingale nature of q t follows from (14) by noticing that
Observe as well that q t is a jump process driven by the Poisson demand, and as a bounded martingale will converge to q ∞ P q -a.s. (q ∞ is a random variable which takes under P q the value 1 with probability q and 0 with probability 1 − q.) As long as no sales occur, q t increases deterministically towards one; the process jumps down by a factor of η(q t− ) when a sales occurs. These jumps depend on the value of the belief and tend to zero as q approaches either zero or one (see figure 3 which depicts a pathwise evolution of the belief process under a constant price policy.) As we should expect, equation (14) seller's belief process in (14) were computed for an arbitrary adapted pricing strategy represented by the process λ t . For the rest of this section, we concentrate on characterizing an optimal pricing policy. Note that retailer controls the unscaled demand rate λ t while the actual rate realized is in fact θ λ t which in turns induces a revenue rate of θc(λ t ). The revenue rate function c(·) satisfies the same set of assumptions as in the previous section. Therefore, in such context, the problem's formulation can be written as follows
The value function associated with the dynamic programming formulation is now V (n, q) where the state variables are the level of inventory n and the seller's beliefs q. We defineθ(
to be the expected demand scale factor given the available information at time t.
The HJB equation is then given by (see Appendix C2 for a derivation)
Recall that the function W (n; θ) is the value function when there is no uncertainty about the true value of θ and is computed using the recursion in equation (10), that is,
As in equation (10), we can rewrite the HJB condition using the Fenchel-Legendre transform of c(λ) in the following convenient form
In general, we cannot obtain a closed form solution to the previous difference-differential equation. However, its recursive structure suggests the following algorithm to compute V (n, q).
Algorithm:
Step 1) Initialization: Set V (0, q) = R for all q ∈ [0, 1] and n = 1.
Step 2) Iteration: Set F (q) = V n − 1, q − η(q) and solve the following ordinary differential equation (ODE) for G(q) in the domain q ∈ [0, 1]:
Set V (n, q) = G(q) and n = n + 1.
Step 3) Goto Step 2.
The main step in this algorithm is to solve the ODE in step 2. This is not a straightforward task as the border conditions at q = 0 and q = 1 are singular points for the differential equation since η(0) = η(1) = 0. Hence, even the existence of a solution to (17) is a subtle issue. Fortunately, the following proposition takes care of this problem.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique sequence of functions, {V (n, ·) : n ≥ 1}, defined on [0, 1] and satisfying the system of equations (16) with border conditions V (n, 0) = W (n; θ H ) and V (n, 1) = W (n; θ L ).
Proof: The proof of this proposition requires a number of intermediate steps and can be found in Appendix B.
Despite the fact that we do not have an analytical solution to (16), this optimality condition provides enough information to derive some useful properties that we use to approximate the value function and the corresponding pricing strategy.
Proposition 5 i) The value function V (n, ·) is monotonically decreasing and convex in q. It is also bounded by the perfect information values for all n ≥ 1 and q
ii) Furthermore, V (n, ·) converges uniformly to the linear function Rθ(·) as n → ∞, and
Proof: See section A4 in Appendix A.
As expected, part (i) of the proposition shows that the value function decreases with q and it is bounded by the value function in the full information case when θ = θ L and θ = θ H . The asymptotic result in part (ii) shows that the optimal demand intensity converges to λ * which maximizes the instantaneous revenue rate. Hence, as n gets large the retailer favors revenue exploitation over demand exploration when selecting the optimal selling rate. The asymptotic result also shows that the value function converges to the linear function R (θ L q + θ H (1 − q)) as the number of initial units grows to infinity. This limiting behavior suggests a simple method to approximate the value function. We undertake this asymptotic analysis in the following section.
Asymptotic Approximation
Based on Proposition 5, it seems that (for a fixed inventory level n) V (n, q) is well approximated by a linear function of q. In particular, we consider for each n ≥ 1 and q ∈ [0, 1], the following approximation of V (n, q)
In what follows, we will use the tilde (∼) notation to denote the asymptotic approximation of quantities such as the value function in (18) or the demand intensity in (19).
The next result shows that the the linear approximation is not only suggested by the limiting result on V (n, ·) but it also represents an upper bound for the value function. More importantly, it approaches the value function in a strong sense, i.e. their ratio goes to one uniformly in q. Combining Propositions 1 and 5, we obtain that Proposition 6 The approximation in (18) defines an upper bound of the value function, i.e.,
for all q ∈ [0, 1] and for all n. Furthermore, the approximation is asymptotically and uniformly (in q) exact, as n goes to infinity. That is,
The upper bound is due to the convexity of V in q. Because of the boundedness of V , the uniform convergence of the ratio is guarantied if the difference converges uniformly to zero. Using triangle inequality we write
Both terms on the right converge to zero uniformly in q. The first one through Proposition 5. The second term is smaller than Rθ H − W (n; θ H ) + W (n; θ L ) − Rθ L which is independent of q and converges to zero.
In the remaining of this section, we use this linear approximation to get further insights on the retailer's optimal strategy. First, let us turn to the optimal pricing strategy. In this case, we are interested in characterizing λ * (n, q), which is the optimal demand rate given that the retailer has n units in inventory and his belief about θ equals q. The optimal price in state (n, q) can be found evaluating the inverse demand function p(λ). Combining the optimality condition in (15) and the linear approximation in (18), we suggest an approximation of the value of λ * (n, q) as the solution to the following optimization problem
where
Using the definition of the function ζ(z) in (9), we can rewrite λ(n, q) as follows.
Since ζ(z) increases with z, q − η(q) increases with q, and ∆W (n,
and
. Figure 4 plots the values of λ(n, q) as a function of q for three different values of n. The horizontal dashed line corresponds to λ * . As we can see, the value ofλ(n, q) converges rapidly to λ * as n increases. Consistent with Corollary 1, the demand rate increases (decreases) with n for small (large) values of q. Interestingly, for intermediate values there such monotonicity does not hold and the demand rate oscillates up and down as n increases.
To assess the performance of the asymptotic approximation, we conduct two types of experiments. First, we compare the pricing strategies resulting from the optimal and asymptotic policies. Second, we compare the expected discounted profits.
To measure the advantage of our approximation with respect to other alternative policies, we also consider the popular myopic (or certainty equivalent) approximation of the value function 
We start by observing that this policy is asymptotically optimal (in the sense that V M (n, q) converges to Rθ(q) as n goes to infinity). We call this approximation myopic because it models the discounted profit that a retailer would expect to get if he myopically considers the expected valuē θ(q) to be the true value of the scale factor θ. As opposed to our original active learning strategy, such strategy falls into a passive learning approach. Associated to this myopic approximation, we define the corresponding myopic demand intensity
To determine the accuracy of the pricing policies induced by the asymptotic and myopic approximation, we compute the following performance measures
. Tables 1 and 2 show the value of these measures for the exponential and linear demand models, respectively. The numerical values for the demand parameters, Λ and α, come from Figure 1 in Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) and the values for the scaling parameter are θ H = 5.0 and θ L = 0.5.
As a general comment, we note that E p and E M p behave quite similarly under both the exponential and linear demand models. As expected, E p and E M p go to zero as q goes to zero or one and the quality of both approximations increases with n. However, for intermediate values of q and n the asymptotic approximation substantially outperforms the myopic policy. On average, the suboptimality of the asymptotic approximation is only 1% compare to a 10% suboptimality of the myopic policy supporting the good performance of the asymptotic approximation even for small values of the inventory (n).
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Asymptotic Approximation: E p (n, q) Let us now look at the performance of the asymptotic and myopic approximation in terms of the average discounted profit they generate. In this case, we compute the following performance measures
whereṼ Approx (n, q) and V M Approx (n, q) are the seller's expected discounted profit under the pricing policy resulting from the Asymptotic and Myopic approximations, respectively. Tables 3 and 4 show that the Asymptotic policy performs quite well for entire range of inventories (n) and beliefs (q) and for both demand models. The average error is around 0.10% for the exponential demand model and 0.01% for the linear demand model. On the contrary, the Myopic approximation performs poorly specially for intermediate values of the inventory and belief. The average error of this Myopic policy is closed to 17% for the exponential demand model and near 45% for the linear demand model. Note also that the relative error for the Myopic policy can reach the highest possible value of 100% for the linear demand model. This happens because under the Myopic approximation the corresponding demand intensity (in equation (20) for some states (n, q). This is equivalent to shutting down the retail operations. This clearly suboptimal strategy never occurs under the Asymptotic approximation. In conclusion, not only the suggested approximation has a simple form (linear in q) but also behaves very well numerically (supported as well by mathematical limiting results).
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of the seller's preferences over different states (n, q) . First of all, we note that (similarly to the full information case) even though the cost of the initial units is sunk, it is not necessarily true that the value function is increasing in n, i.e., the retailer is not always better off with more units. Specifically, in the case where the initial belief q is near one, more units will delay the retailer from liquidating this low-revenue product. On the other hand, more units gives the retailer more time for learning. In the next proposition we study the monotonicity of V through its approximationṼ and show that, for all q < 1, although V (·, q) might decrease with n, there exists an inventory threshold after whichṼ (·, q) becomes increasing in n.
Proposition 7
For any fixed level of the prior q < 1, there exists a level of inventory n 0 (q), where the approximated value functionṼ (·, q) is increasing in n for all n ≥ n 0 .
Proof: See section A5 in Appendix A.
In the full information case the retailer is able to partition the products in two categories (highrevenue and low-revenue products), based on the value of θ compared to 1. In the incomplete information case, such partition depends on the initial belief and the inventory level. Prior to accepting a batch of n units of a product, the seller would like to compare his prior q, to the valuê q(n) solution to V (n, q) = R. This quantity defines the belief threshold between high-revenue and low-revenue products as a function of the initial stock. The monotonicity in q of the value function implies that (i)q(n) is unique and (ii), in expectation, the retailer would be better off discarding the product if q >q(n). Observe as well that in general,q(n) is different from
, solution itself toθ(q) = 1. However, as a result of Proposition 5 -in the limit as the inventory gets large-q(n) converges to
One can show similarly to the proof of Proposition 7 that the solution to the equationṼ (n, q) = R is monotone in n for n larger than a certain threshold. Therefore, one expects a similar behavior forq(n). Figure 5 plots the values ofq(n) as a function of n for the case of an exponential demand rate. In this case,q(n) is indeed increasing in n. This monotonicity suggests that the seller is willing to take more risk (measured by an increase in q) for larger orders (measured by an increase in n). For example in Figure 5 , if the seller's initial belief is q = 0.48 then an order of n = 5 units is not attractive while an order of n = 15 units becomes attractive. Intuitively, for small orders, the event that the product is high-revenue (i.e., θ = θ H ) has a small impact on the cumulative discounted profit with respect to the opportunity cost R. In other words, the potential value for demand learning increases with the size of the order.
Dynamic Pricing Under Optimal Stopping Time Rule
In many settings, a retailer that has acquired a certain number of units of a non-perishable product will carry on selling those units until they are sold out. However, in some cases the seller has the option to discontinue the current sales at any random time. This can occur for instance by moving the current product to a secondary market (or simply to another floor like Filene † 's basement).
In this section, we consider a similar setting to the one discussed in the previous section but allowing the seller to stop the current sales and achieve the terminal value R at any point in time. We restrict ourselves to times that depend on the current history (i.e. stopping times). In the full information case the seller chooses at time zero either to acquire the units or not. When learning is taken into account, the seller will pursue the business as long as the value function is greater than R and will decide to drop it as soon as the value function hits R. The case in which this terminal reward R depends on the number of unsold units at the time of stopping is discussed in section 6.
The formulation of this problem in this case can be written as follows
The optimality (HJB) equation is given by
which can be written also as follows
We denote by q * n the smallest value of q for which U (n, q) = R.
Proposition 8 i) The system of equations given by (22) admits a unique continuously differentiable solution
is the unique solution of the smooth pasting condition
ii) The value function, U (n, ·) is decreasing and convex in q on [0, 1]. † A US department store, famous for its basement floor where discounted items are sold.
iii) The sequence (U (n, ·) : n ≥ 1) is increasing in n and satisfy for all n ≥ 1 and q ∈ [0, 1]
Proof: See section A6 in Appendix A.
The previous Proposition shows that most properties of the value function are maintained when the option of stopping is permitted. However, as opposed to the value function V discussed in Section 4, U is guaranteed to be increasing in n. Indeed, with the option of stopping available one can do at least as good with n units than with n + 1. In order to completely compare both situations one ought to look at costs considerations. In our context, we assume the initial units are given and the cost is sunk. It should be also clear at this point that the value function when the option of stopping is not allowed represents a lower bound for U , i.e., V (n, q) ≤ U (n, q) for all n ≥ 0 and q ∈ (0, 1). Now, we suggest the following algorithm to compute the value function.
Algorithm:
Step 1) Initialization: Set U (0, q) = R for all q ∈ [0, 1] and n = 1.
Step 2) Iteration: Set F (q) = U n − 1, q − η(q) and (i) solve for the unique solution of
set q * n to be this solution (ii) solve the following ordinary differential equation (ODE) for G(q) in the domain q ∈ [0, q * n ]:
(iii) set U (n, q) = G(q) for q ≤ q * n and U (n, q) = R otherwise. Set n = n + 1.
Again, the main step in this algorithm is solving the ODE in equation (23). The task here is simpler than in Section 4 as the border condition is well defined, that is, the ODE does not have a singularity at q * n and can be solved using standard methods (e.g., Picard iteration).
We now discuss some properties of q * n which is the value of the belief (when the current stock is n units) at which the retailer will choose to stop selling the current product and move to the next one. In other words, if the current number of units is n and the current belief is q < q * n , then the retailer will keep on selling the initial product. Otherwise, he will stop and move to the next one. The quantity q * n allows then the retailer to partition again the products in two categories of high-revenue and low-revenue ones.
Proposition 9
The sequence (q * n : n ≥ 1) is increasing in n and converges to q * ∞ < 1 as n → ∞. The sequence is also bounded by
where for all n ≥ 1, the upper bound q n is the unique solution to
Proof: See section A7 in Appendix A.
In the setting where stopping is allowed, we have showed that the value function U is always increasing in the current inventory n. Hence, the threshold q * n (solution to U (n, q) = R) is increasing as well in n. This monotonicity suggests that the seller is willing to take more risks (i.e., measured by larger values of q) for larger initial inventory n. Indeed, higher initial inventory levels offer a greater opportunity for learning which make them more attractive to the seller. Observe, however, that the upper bound q * ∞ is strictly less than 1, and so the willingness to take risk is limited; if q is greater than q * ∞ then independently of the order size the seller always rejects such product.
We recall here that for a particular value of inventory and belief, the value function in the case where stopping is allowed is always larger than the value function when such option is not available (V (n, q) ≤ U (n, q)). Therefore, the threshold q * n is always larger thanq n (solution to V (n, q) = R). This inequality implies that the set of high-revenue products is larger in the case where stopping is allowed compared to the case where it is not. Put differently, consider n units of a product that the retailer is contemplating selling. If the product's prior q is such thatq n < q < q * n , then the product is considered a non-profitable one (low-revenue) in the case where stopping is not allowed and a profitable product (high-revenue) in the case where stopping is allowed. Figure 6 depicts the behavior of q * n andq n as a function of n. As we can see the option of stopping has a significant effect on the seller's segmentation of profitable and non-profitable products. We suggested above an algorithm to solve numerically for the value function U ; however, it is impossible in general to obtain a closed-form expression for it. The remaining of this section will be devoted first to obtain a limiting result as n gets large and second to suggest approximations to the value function that we later test numerically.
Proposition 10 For all n ≥ 1, the value function U (n, ·) is bounded above and below by piecewise linear functions such that for all
Furthermore, the sequence of value functions U (n, ·) : n ≥ 1 converges uniformly on
Proof: See section A8 in Appendix A.
The previous Proposition shows that the value function converges as the number of the initial inventory becomes large. It also gives a lower and an upper bound both linear in q and truncated at R. We denote by U L (n, q) and U U (n, q) the lower and upper bounds of U (n, q) appearing in (25) (see Figure 7) . Lacking a simple limiting result, we suggest these bounds as possible approximations of the optimal value function. Observe that the lower bound is just the tangent at zero until it hits R, while the upper bound is a straight line linking the value U (n, 0) at zero, to R atq n (recall thatq n is an upper bound of q * n ). All the parameters of these segments are known without having to solve for U . Indeed, the value function at zero is W (n, θ H ), the tangent at zero is equal to the known value V q (n, 0) (we can prove this by induction using similar arguments as those in Lemma B4 in Appendix B). Finally,q n is solution to equation (24) which is independent of U .
In order to assess the performance of the bound-based approximations, we follow a similar approach to the one used in Section 4. We first introduce two additional approximations. The first one is an approximation based on the myopic policy discussed in Section 4,
The other one, is the piecewise linear
where q 0 is such that each "piece" of U (n, q 0 ) at q 0 to R atq n . We put, U H (n, q) = R for q ≥q n . Such approximation is meant to take into account the change of slope of the original value function.
In order to compare these four different approximations, we compute for each of them, a corresponding pricing strategy given for i ∈ {U, L, M, H} by the following equation
We define the following performance measure,
where U i Approx (n, q), is the seller's discounted profit under a particular approximating pricing policy. We cannot expect these approximations to perform as well as the one suggested in Sections 4. Indeed, none of them become asymptotically close to the optimal value function. Figure 7 depicts the gap between the bounds, and the optimal value function. This gap will not improve much as n gets large. These approximations, however, have the advantage of being simple (linear or piecewise linear functions of q) consistent with our previous approximation in Section 4. The lower bound behaves as good as the myopic policy (this is expected as both coincide when n gets large
. The upper bound gives even better results. The numerical analysis is summarized in Table 5 below. We observe, that the relative error defined above range bound approximation is giving the best results with a relative error strictly less than 1% for all values of the belief q and inventory n. Finally, as argued above, the value function corresponding to the lower bound behaves numerically similarly to the myopic strategy.
Exponential Demand Model

Extensions
Multidimensional Scale factor θ
The models discussed so far assume that the unknown scale factor θ can take only two values θ H and θ L . In many practical situations the seller may want to enlarge this set of possible values to {θ 1 , . . . , θ d } (d ≥ 2) to enrich the modeling of the demand process. Naturally, the choice of d trades off the accuracy of the demand model and the computational effort needed to solve the corresponding multidimensional dynamic program.
From a mathematical standpoint, expanding the support of θ is equivalent to expanding the belief process to a multidimensional vector q(t) = (q 1 (t), . . . , q d (t)) where q i (t) = P q [θ = θ i |F t ]. The optimization problem in this case becomes (we omit the derivation of the SDE for q(t))
whereθ(q(t)) :
is the expected value of θ given the belief q(t). Based on the results in the previous sections, we know that even for the simplest case d = 2 the corresponding HJB optimality condition does not admit a tractable analytical solution. For this
reason, we will not analyze this model in full detail but simply present the following extension of the asymptotic approximation in Proposition 5 to this multidimensional case.
Proposition 11 Consider the seller's optimization problem (28)-(31) with constraint (31) replaced
by τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : N t = 0} (i.e., the stopping time option is not available). Then, the corresponding value function V (n, q) is convex in q and converges (uniformly in q) as n goes to infinite
The proof of this result mimics the proof of Proposition 5 and it is omitted. Based on this result we propose the following approximation for V (n, q) if the stopping option is not available.
Each of the W (n, θ i ) is computed using the recursion in (10).
Final Reward with Salvage Value
A potential improvement of our model is to make the opportunity cost R a function of the terminal level of inventory. Obviously, this extension is irrelevant if the option to stop is not available; in this case the final inventory is always zero. However, if the retailer can stop selling the product at any time (as in section 5) then we may want to include a salvage value for the unsold units. Specifically, let R(n) be seller's opportunity cost when there are n units of inventory.
The formulation of the problem remains almost the same than in the case of Section 5 except for the objective function which becomes
The only difference between this formulation and (21) is the value of the terminal reward R(n). Such modification will result in the following optimality (HJB) equation, for each fixed n and
Most of the results of section 5 extend directly to this case if we impose the following two conditions on R(n).
(A1) The function R(n) is increasing in n.
The monotonicity of R(n) is a natural requirement consistent with the notion of salvage value. The second condition guarantees that for every inventory level n the retailer always prefers to sell a high-revenue product (θ = θ H ) than to liquidate it and collect the terminal reward R(n).
The following proposition summarizes the main properties of U (n, q). The proof is omitted as it follows the same line of arguments than the proofs of propositions 9 and 10. Before stating the result, we introduce the following quantities. Similar to section 5, let q * n be the solution to U (n, q) = R(n). Denote by q n andq n , respectively the solutions to
Proposition 12 Suppose conditions (A1) and (A2) hold. Then, the value function U (n, q) is increasing in n and decreasing and convex in q. Furthermore, for every n, the threshold q * n ∈ [q n ,q n ], and the value function is bounded by
We note that in this case, the threshold q * n is not necessarily increasing in n. Finally, we mention that other results of section 5 hold as well; for instance, we can similarly use the upper and lower bounds on U (n, q) as approximations of the true value function to estimate the optimal pricing strategy.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied the problem faced by a retailer that sells non-perishable products to a Poisson arriving and price sensitive stream of customers with unknown demand intensity. The uncertainty in the demand rate is modeled by a single factor θ which is used as a proxy to capture the unknown size of the market. The retailer is initially endowed with a finite inventory of the product and a prior belief about the value of θ. In this setting, the retailer's problem is to maximize the expected discounted cumulative revenue adjusting dynamically the price of the product and using Bayesian learning to update the distribution of θ. Besides the uncertainty on the demand intensity, the model differs from the traditional revenue management problem in two important aspects. First, and because the product is nonperishable, the selling horizon is not (a priori) bounded. Second, the model includes explicitly an opportunity cost that the retailer incurs when he decides to sell a particular nonperishable product instead of a different assortment.
The analysis of the retailer's problem was divided in three parts. In section 3, we considered the case in which θ is known with certainty at time 0. In this perfect information case, the problem admits a tractable dynamic programming formulation that we showed how to solve efficiently. The main insight in this case is that the retailer can partition the set of non-perishable products in two categories depending on the value of θ. If θ is larger than a fixed threshold (that we normalized to 1) the product offers high returns compared to the retailer's average revenue (captured by the opportunity cost R). On the other hand, if θ is low (less than 1 in our normalized system) the product generates lower than average revenues. Hence, if the retailer were able to observe in advance the value of θ, he would only engage in selling high-revenue products. An interesting features of the solution is that even though optimal prices increase with θ the resulting optimal selling rates also increase with θ. That is, high-revenue products are sold at a higher price and have a higher inventory turnover than low-revenue products.
In section 4 we relaxed the perfect information assumption and considered the case in which θ is unknown. We also assumed that the retailer is constrained to sell completely the initial inventory before a different assortment can be offered. The analysis of this model is more involved as the state description requires a new state variable to capture the retailer's beliefs about the value of θ. As a result, the resulting dynamic program does not admit a simple analytical solution. Nevertheless, we propose a recursive algorithm to solve the corresponding HJB that requires solving a one-dimensional ODE on each iteration. Because of this lack of tractability, we propose a simple approximation to compute the value function and associated optimal pricing strategy. The proposed policy is based on the fact that as the inventory gets large the retailer's discounted revenue (as a function of the initial belief) converges uniformly to a straight line that we can characterize in closed form. This asymptotic property is used to develop a simple approximation that showed a good performance when compared numerically to the optimal solution. Our computational experiments, summarized in Tables 3 and 4, reveal that the asymptotic approximation has on average a relative error which is less than 1%. This is a remarkable good performance if we consider that the Myopic policy (which is also asymptotically optimal) has an average relative error closed to 30%.
In section 5 we considered the case in which the retailer can stop selling the product at any time and move to a different assortment. This stopping decision depends on the inventory level, the retailer's beliefs about the true value of θ and the opportunity cost. The HJB optimality condition in this case resembles the one encountered in §4 but includes an extra degree of complexity. The stopping time option creates a free boundary condition that complicates the analysis and solution techniques. In particular, the asymptotic analysis that proved so effective in the model of section 4 does not produce a similar result in this case with stopping. Moreover, we were not able to characterize in simple terms the asymptotic limit of the value function (as inventory gets large) and so we could not derive an asymptotic approximations as we did in the case without the stopping option. Instead, we derive piecewise linear upper and lower bounds for the optimal value function which, together with the HJB condition, produce a simple procedure to estimate the optimal pricing strategy. The numerical experiments in Table 5 suggest that the upper bound approximation performs better with an average relative error of less than 1%.
A distinguishing feature of our model with uncertain demand intensity is that the retailer must trade off exploration versus exploitation. That is, by adjusting the price the retailer can influence both the rate at which new information is gathered and the rate at which revenues are collected. Our results in sections 4 and 5 suggest that the retailer is willing to take more risk -measured by an increase in the probability that the product is low-revenue-for larger orders. Furthermore, when the stopping time option is available the retailer might accept to sell a large batch even if his initial belief of θ is strictly less than one. This behavior can be explained by the fact that larger batches offer a larger exploration opportunity. That is, with larger batches the retailer has more time to learn and hence is willing to take more risk for this option to learn.
There are a number of possible future research directions. First of all, we can generalize our formulation by considering a non-stationary demand process including, for example, a time component in the unscaled intensity, i.e., λ(t, p) . This is an important extension in our nonperishable product setting as it captures the evolution of the product life cycle. Another extension to this model would make the salvage value R random depending on θ. This will cover situations where learning not only informs the retailer about the current product's demand but also helps him predict demand in the future (capturing possible correlation among successive products and economic business cycles). A special case of such setting occurs when the seller's inventory decisions are made contingent upon his knowledge of the market captured by θ.
In revenue management problems in general and in ours in particular, one assumes the cost of initial units to be sunk and no replenishment permitted. However, in some retail businesses, replenishment is certainly an option. An interesting research project would be to generalize our dynamic pricing with learning to the case when the retailer can choose either to continue with the current product by ordering a new amount or moving to a different product and basically making R. The cost component needs to be introduced in this case. The problem becomes even more complicated, but seems an interesting and a natural continuation of this paper.
Another possible extension would be to consider the operation of a retailer that sells simultaneously a menu of substitute and complementary products. It would be interesting to embed our modeling framework with unknown demand intensity in this case. Some preliminary results in this direction are presented in Caro and Gallien (2005) using a finite horizon setting with no opportunity costs. Finally, another interesting extension is to consider a different learning approach. Our Bayesian method assumes that the retailer has a prior belief about the value of θ. This prior preconditions the retailer's learning process and, therefore, the resulting pricing strategy. It would be interesting to study a related problem in which the retailer does not have prior but instead uses a maximum likelihood approach. We are currently exploring this variant that to the best of our knowledge has received little attention in the dynamic pricing literature.
APPENDIX A: Main Proofs
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
The existence and uniqueness of a solution W (n) follows by noticing that recursion (10) is equivalent to F(W (n)) = W (n − 1), where the function
is continuous, strictly increasing and ranges from [Φ(0), ∞). This follows from the fact that Φ(z) is continuous and nondecreasing. Therefore, F admits an inverse function F −1 which is continuous strictly increasing and non-negative in the domain [Φ(0), ∞). Since Φ(0) ≤ 0 ≤ R, it follows that W (n) is uniquely determined through the recursion
We now prove the monotonicity and concavity of W (n) for the case θ ≥ 1. The proof in the case θ ≤ 1 uses the same line of arguments and it is left to the reader. Suppose that θ ≥ 1. We proof the monotonicity of W (n) by induction. 
III) Let us prove that W (n) ≥ W (n − 1). Again, by contradiction, let us suppose that W (n) < W (n − 1). Condition (10) implies Φ r W (n) θ > 0 and so we must have θ R < W (n) < W (n − 1). In addition, by condition (10) we also have that
Since Φ(z) is monotonically increasing and W (n − 1) > θ R we conclude
which contradicts the induction step (II). We conclude that W (n) ≥ W (n − 1).
To prove the concavity of W (n) simply note that condition (10) implies
Since both Φ(z) and W (n) are monotonically increasing in their corresponding arguments, we conclude that the right hand side above is monotonically decreasing in n and so W (n) is concave.
Finally, to prove the asymptotic behavior of W (n), we first note that W (n) is bounded. In fact, for the case θ ≤ 1 the boundedness follows since W (n) is decreasing and nonnegative and so W (n) ∈ [0, W (0)]. On the other hand, for the case θ ≥ 1, W (n) is increasing in n and so by condition (10) and the monotonicity of Φ(z) it follows that rW (n)/θ ≤ c * , or equivalently, W (n) ≤ θ R. Given that W (n) is bounded and monotonic (either increasing if θ ≥ 1 or decreasing if θ ≤ 1), we have that lim n→∞ W (n) exists. If we denote by W (∞) this limit, then letting n → ∞ in condition (10) and using the continuity of Φ(z), we conclude that Φ(
A2. Proof of Proposition 2
First, we prove that the auxiliary function f (z) z + p(ζ(z)) is increasing in z. For this, note that condition (12) in Proposition 3 implies that
Furthermore, ζ(z) being the maximizer of λz + c(λ), we have that z + ζ(z)p (ζ(z)) + p(ζ(z)) = 0 in the case of an interior solution; which in turns implies by differentiating that
Combining this identity and the monotonicity of ζ(z), we obtain that f (z) is increasing in z. In the case where ζ(z) is not an interior point, then ζ(z) = Λ or ζ(z) = 0 and so in both cases f is linear and is still increasing in z.
We let now y n θ λ * n be the optimal demand intensity given θ and an inventory of n units. We also define z n −(W (n, θ) − W (n − 1, θ) ). From the definition of λ * n in (11), we have that y n = θ ζ(z n ). Also, combining the definition c(λ) = λ p(λ) and the HJB equation (7), we get that
Hence, the pair (y n , z n ) solves the system of equations
The function f 1 (z, θ) θ ζ(z) is increasing in both θ and z. From the monotonicity of f (z), it follows that the function
is increasing in θ and decreasing in z ∈ Z. From these conditions, we conclude that the optimal demand intensity y n = θ λ * n is increasing in θ for every n.
A3. Proof of Proposition 3
We recall that D t = N 0 −N t is the cumulative demand up to time t, which has a Poisson distribution with mean θI λ (t). Recall that I λ (t) = t 0 λ s ds. The function λ t = λ(p t ) is the unscaled demand intensity at time t given the pricing policy p t selected by the seller. Let us denote by P θ |F t the restriction of P θ to F t and
to be the Radon-Nikodyn derivative of P θ L |F t with respect to P θ H |F t . From Bayes's rule, we get
Now, the likelihood ratio L t for the Poisson is given by (e.g., Brémaud 1980)
which implies
From this condition, we can now obtain the dynamics of the seller's belief process (q t : t ≥ 0). For that, we write
is an F t -semimartingale and f is a twice differentiable and bounded function given by f (n)
. From Itô's lemma (e.g., Ethier and Kurtz (1986) ) and the fact that Y t is a finite variation process (which follows from the fact that D(t) is a pure-jump process and I λ (t) is non-decreasing), we get
Taking advantage of the pure-jump nature of D t and the continuity of I λ (t), we have dD t = ∆D t ,
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A4. Proof of Proposition 5
The monotonicity and boundedness of V (n, q) are proven in the proof of proposition 4 in Appendix B. To prove the convexity of V (n, q) with respect to q, we define
for an arbitrary policy λ ∈ A. We consider a pair of beliefs q 1 , q 2 ∈ [0, 1] and set q = α q 1 +(1−α) q 2 for some α ∈ [0, 1]. Then, convexity follows from
Finally, to prove the uniform convergence of V (n, q), let τ n be the time it takes to sell n units under an optimal pricing policy. Similarly, let τ n (λ) be the time to deplete n units while keeping the demand rate constant at λ. Observe that
To see this note that the Bounded Convergence Theorem allows an interchange of the expected value and the integral. It is then clear that the LHS is an upper bound of the RHS and is achieved for λ t ≡ λ * . Hence,
The second term of the RHS of the previous inequality is bounded by
Using this bound, we write
For the second inequality we use the fact that both differences on the RHS of the first inequality are non-negative. We also used implicitly that τ n (λ) stochastically dominates τ n (Λ) for all 0 ≤ λ ≤ Λ. We can easily show that E q exp(−rτ n (Λ)) = (Λ/(r + Λ)) n . The RHS is then independent of q and converges to 0 as n → ∞. We just showed that (V (n, ·) : n ∈ N) converge uniformly to a function V on [0,1] as n → ∞. This is in agreement with the limiting differential equation obtained from relation (16) by letting n goes to infinity
The linear function Rθ(q) is indeed the unique solution of this ODE.
A5. Proof of Proposition 7
We start by studying the difference W c (n, θ) = W (n, θ)−Rθ. We observe based on the recursion (10) and a first order Taylor expansion as n → ∞ that
By developing recursively the previous equation, we obtain that
Recalling that θ L < θ H and Φ (c * ) > 0, simple computations can show that there exists α > 0,
as n → ∞; where
For all q < 1 we write,
as n → ∞. Therefore the monotonicity of W (n; θ H ) in n implies that ofṼ (n, q) for n large enough, which completes the proof.
A6. Proof of Proposition 8
We start with (ii). The convexity proof follows exactly the same steps as in the case of V (n, ·) in Proposition 5. Similarly, the monotonicity in q follows from the same arguments used in the lemma B2 in Appendix B restricted to (0, q * n ].
For part i.) Observe that the first equation in (22) with the border condition U (n, q * n ) = R defines an ODE where a classical Lipschitz continuity argument proves existence and uniqueness of a continuously differentiable solution on [0,
is continuous on q * n and so it remains to study the continuity of q * n . For that let > 0, define q n ( ) = q * n + and q n ( ) = q * n − . Note that U (n, q n ( )) > R while U (n, q n ( )) = R. By taking the difference between the equations in the previous system (22) at the point q * n , and letting goes to zero, we obtain by continuity of the functions U (n, · ) and
The function U q being non-positive, we conclude that U q (n, q * − n ) = U q (n, q * + n ) = 0, and U (n, · ) is continuously differentiable on [0, 1]. Putting U (n, q) = R we get that q * n is the unique solution of
With the option of stopping available, a retailer with n+1 units can follow the same policy than with n units and so U (n+1, q) ≥ U (n, q). As we saw before, this is not necessarily true if the option of stopping is not available. Finally, the bounds are straightforward.
A7. Proof of Proposition 9
The monotonicity of q * n is a direct consequence of the monotonicity of U (n, q) in n. To proof that the limiting value q * ∞ < 1 note that (1)). Hence, we must have q * ∞ < 1.
The prove that q :
is a lower bound for q * n we note that R + Φ
r R θ(q)
< R for all q < q.
Since by definition q
To derive the upper bound, let us first define the linear function U(n, q) :
From the convexity of U (n, q) as a function of q and the fact that U (n, 0) = W (n, θ H ) and U (n, 1) = R if follows that
is an increasing function of q, it follows that q * n solution of
A8. Proof of Proposition 10
The bounds on U (n, q) follows from its convexity and the definition ofq n . The uniform convergence is due to Dini's Theorem. (Dini's Theorem states that if a monotone sequence of continuous realvalued functions converge pointwise on a compact set to a continuous function, then the convergence is uniform, see Cheney (2001) .) The bounds on U ∞ (q) are again due to the convexity of U ∞ preserved by the uniform convergence.
APPENDIX B: Proof of Proposition 4
In this appendix we investigate the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the following systems of ODEs.
with border conditions V (n, 0) = W (n; θ H ) and V (n, 1) = W (n; θ L ). We approach this task recursively. That is, we will assume that we have a solution to V (n − 1, q) with the desired properties and use it to compute V (n, q).
In what follows, we will drop the dependence on n and use the simpler notation
. Also, and due to some mathematical technicalities, we will solve the following weaker version of the problem.
Problem-L:
Consider two continously differentiable functions F (q) and Φ(q). F (q) is decreasing and Φ(q) is increasing in q ∈ (0, 1]. We are interested to find a continuously differentiable function G(q) in (0, 1) that solves the ODE
with boundary condition
We note that we have replaced the original border conditions at q = 0 and q = 1 by (b2) which is only a limiting condition at q = 1. Fortunately, we will show that any solution to this weaker Problem-L satisfies the original border conditions at both q = 0 and q = 1.
For completeness, we also define G 0 to be the unique root of
The monotonicity of the function h(x) = x + Φ( r x θ ) guarantees that both G 0 and G 1 are uniquely defined.
To avoid confusion we will use the following terminology. We will say that G(q) is a solution to the ODE if it solves (b1) in (0, 1). We say that G(q) is a solution to Problem-L if is a solution to the ODE that satisfies the boundary condition (b2).
In what follows, we will prove that there exists a unique solution to Problem-L. This solution will also satisfy the border condition at q = 0. Also, because we are solving the system of ODE recursively, the solution G(q) becomes the function F (q) in the next iteration. Hence, we also need to show that G(q) is continuously differentiable and decreasing in (0, 1]. The following three sections address these issues of the existence, uniqueness and differentiability and monotonicity of a solution to Problem-L, respectively.
B1 Existence
Before discussing the existence of a solution to problem-L, let us first prove three lemmas.
Proof: We prove only part (ii). The proof of (ii) uses the same arguments. SupposeḠ ≤ G 1 then by the definition of G 1 we get
The last inequality follows from the monotonicity of F and Φ and the fact thatθ(q) ≥θ(1). Then, G(q) is decreasing at q =q and so by its continuity we conclude that lim q↑1 G(q) < G 1 .
Lemma B2 Let G(q) be a solution to the ODE. If there is
Proof: The result follows from noticing that the function
is increasing in both x and q. That is, h q (q, x) ≥ 0 and h x (q, x) ≥ 0 for all (q, x) , where h q and h x are the partial derivatives of h(q, x) with respect to the first and second argument respectively. Hence,
where the inequality follows from the assumption G (q 0 ) ≥ 0.
Proof: We prove only the limit at q = 0. The argument for the limit at q = 1 is similar and it is left to the reader. Because G(q) solves the ODE it follows that
Suppose that lim q↓0 G(q) =Ǧ for some realǦ. We will show, by contradiction, thatǦ = G 0 . Let us assume thatǦ = G 0 . Because of the continuity and boundedness of G(q), F (q) and Φ(q), it follows from condition (b3) that there is constant K = 0 such that
The fact that K = 0 follows from the definition (and uniqueness) of G 0 and the assumptionǦ = G 0 . Suppose K > 0 (the case K < 0 uses similar arguments). Because, for some α > 0, η(q) ∼ α q as q → 0 and K = 0, the limit above implies that as q → 0, G (q) ∼ K/(α q) or equivalently G(q) ∼ K/α ln(q) which violates the assumption lim q↓0 |G(q)| < ∞. We conclude thatǦ = G 0 .
We can move to the proof of existence of a solution to Problem-L. For this, we define three families of solutions to the ODE in (b1).
G := G(q) solution to the ODE in (b1) such that lim these are the lower and upper envelopes of the setḠ and G, respectively. Note that Lemma B1 guarantees that bothḠ and G are nonempty and so the infimum and supremum are well defined.
Proposition B1 Suppose G = ∅, then for any q ∈ (0, 1) Proof: The lower bound on G(q) and upper bound onḠ(q) follow from Lemma B1. The equality G(q) =Ḡ(q) follows from the assumption G = ∅. To prove thatG(q) satisfies the ODE, let q 0 ∈ (0, 1) andĜ(q) be the solution of the ODE passing through (q 0 ,G(q 0 )). We will show that G(q) =Ĝ(q) for all q ∈ (0, 1) and soG(q) satisfies the ODE.
Define,G(q) = G(q), thenG(q) is a solution to the ODE and satisfies
Because we are assuming that G = ∅, we must haveĜ ∈Ḡ orĜ ∈ G. We consider only the casê G ∈Ḡ, the proof in the other case follows the same steps. SupposeĜ(q) =G(q) then (by the fact thatG(q) is the lower envelope of the setḠ) there existsǦ(q) ∈Ḡ such thatǦ(q) <Ĝ(q) for all q ∈ (0, 1). But at q 0 the following holdsG(q 0 ) ≤Ǧ(q 0 ) <Ĝ(q 0 ) =G(q 0 ). This contradiction implies thatĜ(q) =G(q) as required.
Next, we need to show that lim q↓0G (q) = G 0 and lim q↑1G (q) = G 1 . We start showing that these limits exists. For the right limit at q = 1, note thatG(q) is continuous in (0, 1); this follows from the fact thatG(q) satisfies the ODE. Now if there is q 0 ∈ (0, 1) such thatG (q 0 ) ≥ 0 then by Lemma B2 the functionG(q) is increasing in [q 0 , 1). Furthermore, by the first part of this proposition,G(q) is also bounded. Hence, the limit (as q ↑ 1) of an increasing and bounded function always exists. On the other hand, if for all q ∈ (0, 1)G (q) < 0 thenG(q) is decreasing and bounded in (0, 1) and, therefore, it must have a limit as q ↑ 1. For the left limit at q = 0, we use a similar argument. Suppose there exists a q 0 ∈ (0, 1) such that G (q 0 ) < 0. Then, by Lemma B2 and the fact thatG(q) satisfies the ODE, we have thatG (q) < 0 for all q ∈ (0, q 0 ]. Hence by the boundedness ofG(q) we conclude that lim q↓0G (q) exists. On the other hand, if for all q ∈ (0, 1)G (q) ≥ 0 then this monotone condition and the boundedness of G(q) imply again that lim q↓0G (q) exists.
Finally, the desired limits lim q↓0G (q) = G 0 and lim q↑1G (q) = G 1 follow from (i) the boundedness ofG(q), (ii) the fact thatG solves the ODE, and (iii) Lemma B3.
The proposition shows thatG(q) is a solution to Problem-L and we must have G = ∅.
B2 Uniqueness
From the previous section, we already know that there exists a solutionG(q) to Problem-L that it is bounded and decreasing in (0, 1) and satisfies lim q↓0G (q) = G 0 and lim q↑1G (q) = G 1 . We can then extend the domain ofG(q) to [0, 1] by definingG(0) = G 0 andG(1) = G 1 .
In order to prove the uniqueness of this functionG(q), we need the following result. By assumption, F (q) is bounded and Φ (x) is nonnegative. Furthermore, by proposition B1G(q) is also bounded . Hence, the assumption lim q↑1G (q) = −∞ implies that there exists q 0 ∈ (0, 1) such that h (q) < 0 for all q ≥ q 0 .
Take > 0 such that q 0 ≤ 1 − . Then, from a first order Taylor expansion we get
Since this is true for any > 0 and h(1) = 0 and h (q) < 0, it follows that h(q 0 ) > 0. We conclude thatG
This is not possible becauseG(q) is decreasing. We conclude that the assumption lim q↑1G (q) = −∞ cannot hold. That is,G(q) admits a left derivative at q = 1. We can use L'Hôpital's rule to computeG (1). (1) θ (1) rG (1)θ(1) − rG(1)θ (1) θ 2 (1) .
Solving for G (1) we get condition (b4).
The lemma asserts that any solutionG(q) to Problem-L must have bounded derivative in (0, 1] whereG (1) is understood to be the left derivative at q = 1. Now, let us suppose that we have two bounded solutionsG(q) andg(q) to Problem-L. Without lost of generality let us suppose thatg(q) ≤G(q) in (0, 1). Otherwise, ifg(q 0 ) =G(q 0 ) for some q 0 ∈ (0, 1) then they must agree in the entire (0, 1) as they solve the same ODE in (b1). Since bothG(p) andg(p) satisfy the ODE it follows that for every q
(b5) The monotonicity of Φ(x) and the boundedness ofG(q) andg(q) imply that there exists a bounded and nonnegative function ξ(q) such that
Then,
By assumption, the left-hand side is nonpositive and the right-hand side is nonnegative. Hence, they must be equal to zero. We conclude then thatG(q) =g(q) which shows uniqueness.
B3 Differentiability and Monotonicity
In order to solve recursively the control problem for V (n, q) using Problem-L, we need to show that any solutionG(q) to this problem is continuously differentiable and decreasing in (0, 1].
The fact thatG(q) is continuously differentiable in (0, 1] follows from proposition B1 and lemma B4.
The monotonicity ofG(q) follows directly from proposition B1 and lemma B2. In fact, from proposition B1 we know that any solutionG(q) to Problem-L is a bounded solution to the ODE and satisfies G 1 ≤ G(q) ≤ G 0 and lim q↓0 G(q) = G 0 and lim q↑1 G(q) = G 1 . By lemma B2 ifG(q) is non-decreasing at any q 0 ∈ (0, 1) then it is non-decreasing at any q ≥ q 0 . Combining these properties ofG(q) it follows that it must be decreasing in (0, 1].
The corresponding maximizer is
The function Ψ(z) is continuously differentiable, nondecreasing and convex. In the domain z ≥ − Λ α , Ψ(z) admits an inverse function Φ(z)
Similarly, this function is continuously differentiable, increasing and concave. Note also that Φ(c * ) = 0.
C2. Derivation of the HJB optimality condition
We consider the stochastic control problem where G λ is the infinitesimal generator of (N t , q t ) given the control λ, which following the notations of Fleming and Soner (1993) is defined by
To compute this last term we apply Itô's lemma to the function V , while noticing that both processes N t and q t have finite variation. Using the fact that N t is a pure-jump process and so dN t = ∆N t , we obtain dV (N t , q t ) = V q (N We define κ(q) q(1 − q)(θ H − θ L ) and write
where the second equality follows from the fact that for a given control λ the process N t +θ(q t )λt−N 0 is an F t -martingale. Finally, letting h ↓ 0 we conclude that
